The foreseen growing role of outsourced machine learning services is raising concerns about the privacy of user data. Several technical solutions are being proposed to address the issue. Hardware security modules in cloud data centres appear limited to enterprise customers due to their complexity, while general multi-party computation techniques require a large number of message exchanges. This paper proposes a variety of protocols for privacy-preserving regression and classification that (i) only require additively homomorphic encryption algorithms, (ii) limit interactions to a mere request and response, and (iii) that can be used directly for important machine-learning algorithms such as logistic regression and SVM classification. The basic protocols are then extended and applied to feed-forward neural networks.
Introduction
The popularity and hype around machine learning, combined with the explosive growth of user-generated data, is pushing the development of machine learning as a service (MLaaS). A typical application scenario of MLaaS is shown in Fig. 1 . It involves a client sending data to a service provider (server) owning and running a trained machine learning model for a given task (e.g., medical diagnosis). Both the input data and the model should be kept private: for obvious privacy reasons on the client's side and to protect intellectual property on the server's side. In this paper we look at various protocols allowing the realisation of such scenario in a minimum number of message exchanges between both parties. Our assumption is that both the client and the server are honest This is an extended version of [19] .
Organisation The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we give a short summary of important machine learning techniques for which we will propose secure protocols. We also recall cryptographic tools on which we will build out protocols. In Section 3, we propose three families of protocols for private inference. They do not depend on a particular additively homomorphic encryption scheme. We next apply in Section 4 our protocols to the private evaluation of neural networks. Finally, the paper concludes in Section 6.
Preliminaries
This section reviews some important machine learning models, which all rely on the computation of an inner product. It also introduces building blocks that are necessary in the subsequent design of our privacypreserving protocols.
Linear Models and Beyond
Owing to their simplicity, linear models (see, e.g., [2, Chapter 3] or [17, Chapters 3 and 4] ) should not be overlooked: They are powerful tools for a variety of machine learning tasks and find numerous applications.
Problem Setup In a nutshell, machine learning works as follows. Each particular problem instance is characterised by a set of d features which may be viewed as a vector (x 1 , . . . , x d ) of R d . For practical reasons, a fixed coordinate x 0 = 1 is added. We let X ⊆ {1} × R d denote the input space and Y the output space. Integer d is called the dimensionality of the input data.
There are two phases:
-The learning phase consists in approximating a target function f : X → Y from D = (x i , y i ) ∈ X × Y | y i = f (x i ) 1 i n , a training set of n pairs of elements. Note that the target function can be noisy. The output of the learning phase is a function h θ : X → Y drawn from some hypothesis set of functions. -In the testing phase, when a new data point x ∈ X comes in, it is evaluated on h θ asŷ = h θ (x). The hat on y indicates that it is a predicted value.
Since h θ was chosen in a way to "best match" f on the training set D, it is expected that it will provide a good approximation on a new data point. Namely, we have h θ (x i ) ≈ y i for all (x i , y i ) ∈ D and we should have h θ (x) ≈ f (x) for (x, ·) / ∈ D. Of course, this highly depends on the problem under consideration, the data points, and the hypothesis set of functions.
In particular, linear models for machine learning use a hypothesis set of functions of the form h θ (x) = g(θ x) where θ = (θ 0 , θ 1 , . . . , θ d ) ∈ R d+1 are the model parameters and g : R → Y is a function mapping the linear calculation to the output space.
When the range of g is real-valued and thus the prediction resultŷ ∈ Y is a continuous value (e.g., a quantity or a probability), we talk about regression. When the prediction result is a discrete value (e.g., a label), we talk about classification. An important sub-case is Y = {+1, −1}. Specific choices for g are discussed in the next sections.
Linear Regression A linear regression model assumes that the real-valued target function f is linearor more generally affine-in the input variables. In other words, it is based on the premise that f is well approximated by an affine map; i.e., g is the identity map: f (x i ) ≈ g(θ x i ) = θ x i , 1 i n, for training data x i ∈ X and weight vector θ ∈ R d+1 . This vector θ is interesting as it reveals how the output depends on the input variables. In particular, the sign of a coefficient θ j indicates either a positive or a negative contribution to the output, while its magnitude captures the relative importance of this contribution.
The linear regression algorithm relies on the least squares method to find the coefficients of θ: it minimises the sum of squared errors n i=1 (f (x i ) − θ x i ) 2 . Once θ has been computed, it can be used to produce estimates on new data points x ∈ X asŷ = θ x.
Support Vector Machines
We now turn our attention to another important problem: how to classify data into different classes. This corresponds to a target function f whose range Y is discrete. Of particular interest is the case of two classes, say +1 and −1, in which case Y = {+1, −1}. Think for example of a binary decision problem where +1 corresponds to a positive answer and −1 to a negative answer.
In dimension d, an hyperplane Π is given by an equation of the form θ 0 + θ 1 X 1 + θ 2 X 2 + · · · + θ d X d = 0 where θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ d ) is the normal vector to Π and θ 0 / θ indicates the offset from the origin.
When the training data are linearly separable, there is some hyperplane Π such that for each (x i , y i ) ∈ D, one has
or equivalently (by scaling θ appropriately):
The training data points x i satisfying y i θ x i = 1 are called support vectors.
When the training data are not linearly separable, it is not possible to satisfy the previous hard constraint y i θ x i 1, (1 i n). So-called "slack variables" ξ i = max(0, 1 − y i θ x i ) are generally introduced in the optimisation problem. They tell how large a violation of the hard constraint there is on each training point-note that ξ i = 0 whenever y i θ x i 1.
There are many possible choices for θ. For better classification, the separating hyperplane Π is chosen so as to maximise the margin; namely, the minimal distance between any training data point and Π. Now, from the resulting model θ, when a new data point x comes in, its class is estimated as the sign of the discriminating function θ x; i.e.,ŷ = sign(θ x). Compare with Eq. (1).
When there are more than two classes, the optimisation problem returns several vectors θ k , each defining a boundary between a particular class and all the others. The classification problem becomes an iteration to find out which θ k maximises θ k x for a given test point x.
Logistic Regression Logistic regression is widely used in predictive analysis to output a probability of occurrence. The logistic function is defined by the sigmoid function
The logistic regression model returns h θ (x) = σ(θ x) ∈ [0, 1], which can be interpreted as the probability that x belongs to the class y = +1. The SVM classifier thresholds the value of θ x around 0, assigning to x the class y = +1 if θ x > 0 and the class y = −1 if θ x < 0. In this respect, the logistic function is seen as a soft threshold as opposed to the hard threshold, +1 or −1, offered by SVM. Other threshold functions are possible. Another popular soft threshold relies on tanh, the hyperbolic tangent function, whose output range is [−1, 1].
Remark 1.
Because the logistic regression algorithm predicts probabilities rather than just classes, we fit it through likelihood optimisation. Specifically, given the training set D, we learn the model by maximising
. This deviates from the general description of our problem setup, where the learning is directly done on the pairs (x i , y i ). However, the testing phase is unchanged: the outcome is expressed as h θ (x) = σ(θ x). It therefore fits our framework for private inference, that is, the private evaluation of h θ (x) = g(θ x) for a certain function g; the sigmoid function σ in this case.
Cryptographic Tools
Representing Real Numbers So far, we have discussed a number of machine learning models using real numbers, but the cryptographic tools we intend to use require working on integers. We therefore start by recalling the necessary conversion. An encryption algorithm takes as input an encryption key and a plaintext message and returns a ciphertext. We let M ⊂ Z denote the set of messages that can be encrypted. In order to operate over encrypted data, we need to accurately represent real numbers as elements of M (i.e., a finite subset of Z).
To do that, since all input variables of machine learning models are typically rescaled in the range [−1, 1], one could use a fixed point representation. A real number x with a fractional part of at most P bits uniquely corresponds to signed integer z = x · 2 P . Hence, with a fixed-point representation, a real number x is represented by
where integer P is called the bit-precision. The sum of x 1 , x 2 ∈ R is performed as z 1 + z 2 and their multiplication as (z 1 · z 2 )/2 P .
Additively Homomorphic Encryption Homomorphic encryption schemes come in different flavours. Before Gentry's breakthrough result ( [13] ), only addition operations or multiplication operations on ciphertextsbut not both-were supported. Schemes that can support an arbitrary number of additions and of multiplications are termed fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes. Our privacy-preserving protocols only need an additively homomorphic encryption scheme. The minimal security notion that we require is semantic security [16] ; in particular, encryption is probabilistic. It is useful to introduce some notation. We let ⟦·⟧ and ⟧·⟦ denote the encryption and decryption algo- It is then decrypted using the matching secret key sk as m = ⟧m⟦ sk . When clear from the context, we drop the pk or sk subscripts and sometimes use ⦃·⦄ s and ⦄·⦃ s to denote another encryption algorithm. If m = (m 1 , . . . , m d ) ∈ M d is a vector, we write m = ⟦m⟧ as a shorthand for (m 1 , . . . , m d ) = (⟦m 1 ⟧, . . . , ⟦m d ⟧).
Algorithm ⟦·⟧ being additively homomorphic (over M) means that given any two plaintext messages m 1 and m 2 and their corresponding ciphertexts m 1 = ⟦m 1 ⟧ and m 2 = ⟦m 2 ⟧, we have m 1 m 2 = ⟦m 1 + m 2 ⟧ and m 1 m 2 = ⟦m 1 − m 2 ⟧ for some publicly known operations and on ciphertexts. By induction, for a given integer scalar r ∈ Z, we also have ⟦r · m 1 ⟧ = ⟦m 1 + · · · + m 1 ⟧ = ⟦m 1 ⟧ · · · ⟦m 1 ⟧ = m 1 · · · m 1 r times
It is worth noting here that the decryption of (m 1 m 2 ) gives (m 1 + m 2 ) as an element of M; that is,
Private Comparison Protocol In [9, 10] , Damgård et al. present a protocol for comparing private values. It was later extended and improved in [12] and [30, 20] . The protocol makes use of an additively homomorphic encryption scheme. It compares two non-negative -bit integers. The message space is M ∼ = Z/M Z with M 2 and is supposed to behave like an integral domain (for example, M a prime or an RSA-type modulus).
DGK+ protocol
The setting is as follows. A client possesses a private -bit value µ = −1 i=0 µ i 2 i and a server possesses a private -bit value η = −1 i=0 η i 2 i . They seek to respectively obtain bits δ C and δ S such that δ C ⊕ δ S = [µ η] (where ⊕ represents the exclusive or operator, and [Pred] = 1 if predicate Pred is true, and 0 otherwise). Following [20, Fig. 1 ], the DGK+ protocol proceeds in four steps:
1. The client encrypts each bit µ i of µ under its public key and sends ⟦µ i ⟧, 0 i − 1, to the server. 2. The server chooses uniformly at random a bit δ S and defines s = 1 − 2δ S . It also selects + 1 random non-zero scalars r i ∈ M, −1 i − 1. 3. Next, the server computes 1
and sends the + 1 ciphertexts ⟦h * i ⟧ in a random order to the client. 4. Using its private key, the client decrypts the received ⟦h * i ⟧'s. If one is decrypted to zero, the client sets δ C = 1. Otherwise, it sets δ C = 0.
Remark 2. At this point, neither the client, nor the server, knows whether µ η holds. One of them (or both) needs to reveal its share of δ (= δ C ⊕ δ S ) so that the other can find out. Following the original DGK protocol [9] , this modified comparison protocol is secure in the semi-honest model (i.e., against honest but curious adversaries).
Correctness The correctness of the protocol follows from the fact that µ η if only and only if:
µ = η, or there exists some index i, with 0 i − 1, such that: 1. µ i < η i , and 2. µ j = η j for i + 1 j − 1 . As pointed out in [9] , when µ = η, this latter condition is equivalent to the existence of some index i ∈ [0, −1], such that µ i − η i + 1 + −1 j=i+1 (µ j ⊕ η j ) = 0. This test was subsequently replaced in [12, 20] to allow the secret sharing of the comparison bit across the client and the server as [µ η] = δ C ⊕ δ S . Adapting [20] , the new test checks the existence of some index i ∈ [0, − 1], such that
is zero. When δ S = 0 (and thus s = 1) this occurs if µ < η; when δ S = 1 (s = −1) this occurs if µ > η. As a result, the first case yields
This discrepancy is corrected in [30] by augmenting the set of h i 's with an additional value h −1 given by h −1 = δ S + −1 j=0 (µ j ⊕ η j ). It is worth observing that h −1 can only be zero when δ S = 0 and µ = η. Therefore, in all cases, when there exists some index i, with −1 i − 1, such that h i = 0, we have
It is easily verified that ⟦h * i ⟧ as computed in Step 3 is the encryption of r i · h i (mod M ). Clearly, if r i · h i (mod M ) is zero then so is h i since, by definition, r i is non-zero-remember that M is chosen such that Z/M Z acts as an integral domain. Hence, if one of the ⟦h * i ⟧'s decrypts to 0 then
This concludes the proof of correctness.
Basic Protocols of Privacy-Preserving Inference
In this section, we present three families of protocols for private inference. They aim to satisfy the ideal requirements given in the introduction while keeping the number of exchanges to a bare minimum. Interestingly, they only make use of additively homomorphic encryption.
We keep the general model presented in the introduction, but now work with integers only. The client holds x = (1, x 1 , . . . , x d ) ∈ M d+1 , a private feature vector, and the server possesses a trained machinelearning model given by its parameter vector θ = (θ 0 , . . . , θ d ) ∈ M d+1 or, in the case of feed-forward neural networks a set of matrices made of such vectors. At the end of protocol, the client obtains the value of g(θ x) for some function g and learns nothing else; the server learns nothing. To make the protocols easier to read, for a real-valued function g, we abuse notation and write g(t) for an integer t assuming g also includes the conversion to real values; see Section 2.2. We also make the distinction between the encryption algorithm ⟦·⟧ using the client's public key and the encryption algorithm ⦃·⦄ s using the server's public key and stress that, not only keys are different, but the algorithm could also be different. We use ⟧·⟦ and ⦄·⦃ s for the respective corresponding decryption algorithms.
Private Linear/Logistic Regression
Private Linear Regression As seen in Section 2.1, linear regression produces estimates using the identity map for g:ŷ = θ x. Since θ x = d j=0 θ j x j is linear, given an encryption ⟦x⟧ of x, the value of ⟦θ x⟧ can be homomorphically evaluated, in a provably secure way [15] .
Therefore, the client encrypts its feature vector x under its public key with an additively homomorphic encryption algorithm ⟦·⟧, and sends ⟦x⟧ to the server. Using θ, the server then computes ⟦θ x⟧ and returns it the client. Finally, the client uses its private key to decrypt ⟦θ x⟧ = ⟦ŷ⟧ and gets the outputŷ. This is straightforward and only requires one round of communication.
Private Logistic Regression Things get more complicated for logistic regression. At first sight, it seems counter-intuitive that additively homomorphic encryption could suffice to evaluate a logistic regression model over encrypted data. After all, the sigmoid function, σ(t), is non-linear.
The key observation is that the sigmoid function is injective:
So the client does not learn more about the model θ from t := θ x than it can learn fromŷ := σ(t) since the value of t can be recovered fromŷ using t = σ −1 (ŷ) = ln(ŷ/(1 −ŷ)). Consequently, rather than returning an encryption of the predictionŷ, we let the server return an encryption of t, without any security loss in doing so.
Our Core Protocol The protocol we propose for privacy-preserving linear or logistic regression is detailed in Fig. 2 . Let (pk C , sk C ) denote the client's matching pair of public encryption key/private decryption key for an additively homomorphic encryption scheme ⟦·⟧. We use the notation of Section 2.2. If B is an upper bound on the inner product (in absolute value), the message space
In more detail, our core protocol goes as follows.
1. In a first step, the client encrypts its feature vector x ∈ M d+1 under its public key pk C and gets
The ciphertext ⟦x⟧ along with the client's public key are sent to the server. 2. In a second step, from its model θ, the server computes an encryption of the inner product over encrypted data as:
The server returns t to the client. 3. In a third step, the client uses its private decryption key sk C to decrypt t, and gets the inner product t = θ x as a signed integer of M. 4. In a final step, the client applies the g function to obtain the predictionŷ corresponding to input vector x.
Since x0 = 1 and is known to the server, it is not necessary to transmit the value of ⟦x0⟧. Fig. 2 : Privacy-preserving regression. Encryption is done using the client's public key and noted ⟦·⟧. The server learns nothing. Function g is the identity map for linear regression and the sigmoid function for logistic regression.
Dual Approach
The previous protocol encrypts with the client's public key pk C . In the dual approach, the server's public key is used for encryption. Let (pk S , sk S ) denote the public/private key pair of the server for some additively homomorphic encryption scheme ⦃·⦄ s , ⦄·⦃ s . The message space M is unchanged.
In this case, the server needs to publish an encrypted version ⦃θ⦄ s of its model. The client must therefore get a copy of ⦃θ⦄ s once, but can then engage in the protocol as many times as it wishes. One could also suppose that each client receives a different encryption of θ using a server's encryption key specific to the client, or that a key rotation is performed on a regular basis. This protocol uses a mask µ which is chosen uniformly at random in M. Consequently, it is important to see that t * (≡ θ x + µ (mod M )) is also uniformly distributed over M. Thus, the server gains no bit of information from t * . The different steps are summarised in Fig. 3 . Fig. 3 : Dual approach for privacy-preserving regression. Here, encryption is done using the server's public key pk S and noted ⦃·⦄ s . Function g is the identity map for linear regression and the sigmoid function for logistic regression.
Variant and Extensions In a variant, in
Step 2 of Fig. 2 (resp. Step 3 of Fig. 3 ), the server can add some noise by defining t as t ← ⟦θ x + ⟧ = ⟦θ x⟧ ⟦ ⟧ (resp. t * as t * ← ⦄t * ⦃ s + ). This presents the advantage of limiting the leakage on θ resulting from the output result. The proposed methods are not limited to the identity map or the sigmoid function but generalise to any injective function g. This includes the tanh activation function alluded to in Section 2.1 where g(t) = tanh(t), as well as
and more. For any injective function g, there is no more information leakage in returning θ x than g(θ x).
Private SVM Classification
As discussed in Section 2.1, SVM inference can be abridged to the evaluation of the sign of an inner product. However, the sign function is clearly not injective. Our idea is to make use of a privacy-preserving comparison protocol. For concreteness, we consider the DGK+ protocol; but any privacy-preserving comparison protocol could be adapted.
A Naïve Protocol A client holding a private feature vector x wishes to evaluate sign(θ x) where θ parametrises an SVM classification model. In the primal approach, the client can encrypt x and send ⟦x⟧ to the server. Next, the server computes ⟦η⟧ = ⟦θ x + µ⟧ for some random mask µ and sends ⟦η⟧ to the client. The client decrypts ⟦η⟧ and recovers η. Finally, the client and the server engage in a private comparison protocol with respective inputs η and µ, and the client deduces the sign of θ x from the resulting comparison bit [µ η].
There are two issues. If we use the DGK+ protocol for the private comparison, at least one extra exchange from the server to the client is needed for the client to get [µ η]. This can be fixed by considering the dual approach. A second, more problematic, issue is that the decryption of ⟦η⟧ := ⟦θ x + µ⟧ yields η as an element of M ∼ = Z/M Z, which is not necessarily equivalent to the integer θ x + µ. Note that if the inner product θ x can take any value in M, selecting a smaller value for µ ∈ M to prevent the modular reduction does not solve the issue because the value of η may then leak information on θ x.
Our Core Protocol Instead, we suggest to select the message space much larger than the upper bound B on the inner product, so that the computation will take place over the integers. Specifically, if θ x ∈ [−B, B] then, letting be the bit-length of B, the message space M = {− M/2 , . . . , M/2 − 1} is dimensioned such that M 2 (2 κ + 1) − 1 for some security parameter κ. Let µ be an ( + κ)-bit integer that is chosen such that µ B. By construction we will then have 0 θ x + µ < M so that the decrypted value modulo M corresponds to the actual integer value. As will become apparent, this presents the further advantage of optimising the bandwidth requirements: the number of exchanged ciphertexts depends on the length of B and not on the length of M (notice that M = #M).
Our resulting core protocol for private SVM classification of a feature vector x is illustrated in Fig. 4 and includes the following steps: 0. The server publishes pk S and ⦃θ⦄ s . 1. Let κ be a security parameter. The client starts by picking uniformly at random in [ 
In a second step, the client computes, over encrypted data, the inner product θ x and masks the result with µ to get
3. Next, the client individually encrypts the first bits of µ with its own encryption key to get ⟦µ i ⟧, for 0 i − 1, and sends t * and the ⟦µ i ⟧'s to the server. 4. Upon reception, the server decrypts t * to get t * := ⦄t * ⦃ s mod M = θ x + µ and defines the -bit integer η := t * mod 2 . 5. The DGK+ protocol is now applied to two -bit values µ :
The server selects the ( + 1)-th bit of t * for δ S (i.e., δ S = t * /2 mod 2), defines s = 1 − 2δ S , and forms the ⟦h * i ⟧'s (with −1 i − 1) as defined by Eq. (3) . The server permutes randomly the ⟦h * i ⟧'s and sends them to the client. 6. The client decrypts the ⟦h * i ⟧'s and gets the h * i 's. If one of them is zero, it sets δ C = 1; otherwise it sets δ C = 0. 7. As a final step, the client obtains the predicted class asŷ = (−1) ¬(δ C ⊕µ ) , where µ denotes bit number of µ. Fig. 4 : Privacy-preserving SVM classification. Note that some data is encrypted using the client's public key pk C , while other, is encrypted using the server's public key pk S . They are noted ⟦·⟧ and ⦃·⦄ s respectively.
Again, the proposed protocol keeps the number of interactions between the client and the server to a minimum: a request and a response.
Correctness To prove the correctness, we need the two following simple lemmata. Lemma 1. Let a and b be two non-negative integers. Then for any positive integer n, (a − b)/n = a/n − b/n + ((a mod n) − (b mod n))/n . Proof. Write a = a n n + (a mod n) and b = b n n + (b mod n). Then a − b = a n − b n n + (a mod n) − (b mod n). Recalling that for n 0 ∈ Z and x ∈ R, x + n 0 = x + n 0 and −n 0 = − n 0 , the lemma follows by integer division through n. Either of those two conditions holds true
and so,
, we get the desired result.
Security The security of the protocol of Fig. 4 follows from the fact that the inner product θ x is statistically masked by the random value µ. Security parameter κ guarantees that the probability of an information leak due to a carry is negligible. The security also depends on the security of the DGK+ comparison protocol, which is provably secure (cf. Remark 2).
A Heuristic Protocol The previous protocol, thanks to the use of the DGK+ algorithm offers provable security guarantees but incurs the exchange of 2( + 1) ciphertexts. Here we aim to reduce the number of ciphertexts and introduce a new heuristic protocol. This protocol requires the introduction of a signed factor λ, such that |λ| > |µ|, and we now use both µ and λ to mask the model. To ensure that λθ x + µ remains within the message space, we pick λ in B where
Furthermore, to ensure the effectiveness of the masking, B should be sufficiently large; namely, #B > 2 κ for a security parameter κ, hence M > 2 (2 κ − 1). The protocol, which is illustrated in Fig. 5 , runs as follows:
1. The client encrypts its input data x using its public key, and sends its key and the encrypted data to the server. 2. The server draws at random a signed scaling factor λ ∈ B, λ = 0, and an offset factor µ ∈ B such that |µ| < |λ| and sign(µ) = sign(λ). The server then defines the bit δ S such that sign(λ) = (−1) δ S and computes an encryption t * of the shifted and scaled inner product t * = (−1) δ S · (λθ x + µ) as
and sends t * to the client. 2 3. In the final step, the client decrypts t * using its private key, recovers t * as a signed integer of M, and deduces the class of the input data asŷ = sign(t * ). Security We stress that the private comparison protocol we use in Fig. 5 does not come with formal security guarantees. In particular, the client learns the value of t * = λθ x + µ with λ, µ ∈ B and |µ| < |λ|. Some information on t := θ x may be leaking from t * and, in turn, on θ since x is known to the client. The reason resides in the constraint |µ| < |λ|. So, from t * = λθ x + µ, we deduce log|t * | log|λ| + log (|t| + 1). For example, when t has two possible very different "types" of values (say, very large and very small), the quantity log|t * | can be enough to discriminate with non-negligible probability the type of t. This may possibly leak information on θ. That does not mean that the protocol is necessarily insecure but it should be used with care.
Remark 3. The bandwidth usage could be even reduced to one ciphertext and a single bit with the dual approach. From the published encrypted model ⦃θ⦄ s , the client could homomorphically compute and send to the server t * = ⦃λθ x + µ⦄ s for random λ, µ ∈ B with |µ| < |λ|. The server would then decrypt t * , obtain t * , compute δ S = 1 2 (1 − sign(t * )), and return δ S to the client. Analogously to the primal approach, the output classŷ = sign(θ x) is obtained by the client asŷ = (−1) δ S · sign(λ). However, and contrarily to the primal approach, the potential information leakage resulting from t * -in this case on x-is now on the server's side, which is in contradiction with our Requirement 1 (input confidentiality). We do not further discuss this variant. 2 Note that instead, one could define λ, µ R ← B with λ > 0 and |µ| < λ, and t * = λθ x + µ. We however prefer the other formulation as it easily generalises to extended settings (see Section 4.1).
Application to Neural Networks
Typical feed-forward neural networks are represented as large graphs. Each node on the graph is often called a unit, and these units are organised into layers. At the very bottom is the input layer with a unit for each of the coordinates x (0) j of the input vector x (0) := x ∈ X . Then various computations are done in a bottom-to-top pass and the outputŷ ∈ Y comes out all the way at the very top of the graph. Between the input and output layers, a number of hidden layers are evaluated. We index the layers with a superscript (l), where l = 0 for the input layer and 1 l < L for the hidden layers. Layer L corresponds to the output. Each unit of each layer has directed connections to the units of the layer below; see Fig. 6a .
Hidden layer l − 1
(a) Going from layer l − 1 to layer l.
Activation function
Inputs (b) Zoom on computing unit j in layer l. j can be expressed as:
Functions g Generic Solution A generic solution can easily be devised from Eq. (4): for each inner product computation, and therefore for each unit of each hidden layer, the server computes the encrypted inner product and the client computes the output of the activation function in the clear. In more detail, the evaluation of a neural network can go as follows.
0. The client starts by encrypting its input data and sends it to the server. 1. Then, as illustrated in Fig. 7 , for each hidden layer l, 1 l < L: (a) The server computes d l encrypted inner products t j corresponding to each unit j of the layer and sends those to the client. (b) The client decrypts the inner products, applies the required activation function g to each unit j of the output layer. This is the required result. Fig. 7 : Generic solution for privacy-preserving evaluation of feed-forward neural networks. Evaluation of hidden layer l.
For each hidden layer l, exactly two messages (each comprising d l encrypted values) are exchanged. The input and output layers only involve one exchange; from the client to the server for the input layer and from the server back to the client for the output layer.
Several variations are considered in [6] . For increased security, provided that the units feature the same type of activation functions in a given layer l (i.e., g (l)
d l ), the server may first apply a random permutation on all units (i.e., sending the t j 's in a random order). It then recovers the correct ordering by applying the inverse permutation on the received ⟦x j . The suggestion of [6] is to approximate the activation function as a polynomial and to rely on oblivious polynomial evaluation [26] for the client to get x (l)
j . Finally, the server may desire not to disclose the topology of the network. To this end, the server can distort the client's perception by adding dummy units and/or layers.
In the following two sections, we improve this generic solution for two popular activation functions: the sign and the ReLU functions. In the new proposed implementations, everything is kept encrypted-from start to end. The raw signals are hidden from the client's view in all intermediate computations.
Sign Activation
Binarised neural networks implement the sign function as activation function. This is very advantageous from a hardware perspective [18] . Section 3.2 describes two protocols for the client to get the sign of θ x. In order to use them for binarised neural networks in a setting similar to the generic solution, the server needs to get an encryption of sign(θ x) for each computing unit j in layer l under the client's key from ⟦x⟧, where ⟦x⟧ := ⟦x (l−1)
⟧ is the encrypted output of layer l − 1 and θ := θ j (l) is the parameter vector for unit j in layer l. We start with the core protocol of Fig. 4 . It runs in dual mode and therefore uses the server's encryption. Exchanging the roles of the client and the server almost gives rise to the sought-after protocol. The sole extra change is to ensure that the server gets the classification result encrypted. This can be achieved by masking the value of δ C with a random bit b and sending an encryption of (−1) b . The resulting protocol is depicted in Fig. 8a .
In the heuristic protocol (cf. Fig. 5 ), the server already gets an encryption of ⟦x⟧ as an input. It however fixes the sign of t * to that of θ x. If now the server flips it in a probabilistic manner, the output class (i.e., sign(θ x)) will be hidden from the client's view. We detail below the modifications to be brought to the heuristic protocol to accommodate the new setting:
-In Step 2 of Fig. 5 , the server keeps private the value of δ S by replacing the definition of t * with t * = ⟦λθ x + µ⟧. -In Step 3 of Fig. 5 , the client then obtainsŷ * := sign(θ x) · (−1) δ S and returns its encryption ⟦ŷ * ⟧ to the server.
-The server obtains ⟦ŷ⟧ as ⟦ŷ⟧ = (−1) δ S ⟦ŷ * ⟧. If θ := θ j (l) and ⟦x⟧ := ⟦x (l) ⟧ then the outcome of the protocol of Fig. 8a or of the modified heuristic protocol is ⟦ŷ⟧ = ⟦x (l) j ⟧. Of course, this can be done in parallel for all the d l units of layer l (i.e., for 1 j d l ; see Eq. (4)), yielding ⟦x (l) ⟧ = (⟦1⟧, ⟦x
. This means that just one round of communication between the server and the client suffices per hidden layer.
ReLU Activation
A widely used activation function is the ReLU function. It allows a network to easily obtain sparse representations and features cheaper computations as there is no need for computing the exponential function [14] .
The ReLU function can be expressed from the sign function as
Back to our setting, the problem is for the server to obtain ⟦ReLU(t)⟧ from ⟦t⟧, where t = θ x with x := x (l−1) and θ := θ j (l) , in just one round of communication per hidden layer. We saw in the previous section how to do it for the sign function. The ReLU function is more complex to apprehend. If we use Equation (5), the difficulty is to let the server evaluate a product over encrypted data. To get around that, the server superencrypts ⟦θ x⟧, gets ⦃ ⟦θ x⟧ ⦄ s , and sends it the client. According to its secret share the client sends back the Client Server (θ, ⟦x⟧)
The roles of the client and the server are interchanged, compared to Fig. 4 : so ⟦·⟧ and ⦃·⦄ s are interchanged and so are δ C and δ S ; s = 1 − 2δ C .
In
Step 7, we abuse theŷ notation to mean either the input to the next layer or the final output.
(a) Core version.
Client
Server (θ, ⟦x⟧) λ, µ R ← B, λ = 0, |µ| < |λ| and sign(µ) = sign(λ) 
where the ' ' in the left-hand side denotes the addition over ⦃·⦄ s while the second one denotes the addition over ⟦·⟧.
Actually, a simple one-time pad suffices to implement the above solution. To do so, the server chooses a random mask µ ∈ M and "super-encrypts" ⟦θ x⟧ as ⟦θ x + µ⟧. The client re-randomises it as t * * := ⟦θ x+µ⟧ ⟦0⟧, computes o := ⟦0⟧, and returns the pair (o, t * * ) or (t * * , o), depending on its secret share. The server uses its secret share to select the correct item and "decrypts" it. If the server (obliviously) picked o, it already has the result in the right form; i.e., ⟦0⟧. Otherwise the server has to remove the mask µ so as to get ⟦θ x⟧ ← t * * ⟦µ⟧. In order to allow the server to (obliviously) remove or not the mask, the client also sends an encryption of the pair index; e.g., 0 for the pair (o, t * * ) and 1 for the pair (t * * , o). Figure 9a details an implementation of this with the DGK+ comparison protocol. Note that to save on bandwidth the same mask µ is used for the comparison protocol and to "super-encrypt" ⟦θ x⟧. The heuristic protocol can be adapted in a similar way; see Fig. 9b Remark 4. It is interesting to note that the new protocols readily extend to any piece-wise linear function, such as the clip function clip(t) = max(0, min(1, t+1
2 )) (a.k.a. hard-sigmoid function). Indeed, as shown in [5] , any piece-wise linear function R → R with p pieces can be represented as a sum of p ReLU functions.
Numerical Experiments
To show the feasibility of our protocols, we consider their implementation using Paillier's cryptosystem. In this section we first recall this cryptosystem and then give timing measurements of code execution and message size estimation showing the feasibility of the proposed methods.
Paillier's Cryptosystem
Paillier's cryptosystem [27] is an asymmetric algorithm which is homomorphic to addition: with the encrypted values of two messages m 1 and m 2 , it is possible to compute an encrypted value of m 1 + m 2 . The scheme is known to be semantically secure under the decisional composite residuosity assumption (DCRA).
Set-up -On input, given a security parameter, each party can create a key pair by picking at random two large primes p and q and computing the product N = p q. The public key is simply pk := N while the private key is sk := {p, q}. The message space is M = Z/N Z. Encryption -To encrypt a message m ∈ M, using the public key pk , one first picks a random integer r R ← [1, N ) and then computes the ciphertext
Decryption -To decrypt the ciphertext m, the recipient first needs to recover r from m using the matching secret key sk as
and then recover the plaintext message m = (m r −N mod N 2 )−1 N .
Homomorphism
The main homomorphism characteristics of this scheme are summarised as follows:
Client
Server (θ, ⟦x⟧) λ, µ R ← B, λ = 0, |µ| < |λ| and sign(µ) = sign(λ)
Heuristic version. Fig. 9 : Privacy-preserving ReLU evaluation with inputs and outputs encrypted under the client's public key.
Graphs
We implemented the protocols presented in the previous sections using the Python (version 3.7.4) programming language and the GNU multiprecision arithmeic library (GMP version 6.1.2) on a 64-bit machine equipped with an Intel i7-4770 processor running at 3.4GHz. The GMP library is essentially used for generating the prime numbers required for the keys and for performing modular exponentiation of large integers. We used a bit precision of P = 53 (see Section 2.2), which corresponds to the number of significant bits for typical IEEE-754 floating point numbers supported by Python. We tested the protocols using randomly generated models and also models based on the Enron-spam data set [24] , a standardized audiology data set [28] , a credit approval data set [1] , a dataset of human activity recognition using smartphones [4] , and the breast cancer database from University of Wisconsin Hospitals, Madison [31] . Performance measurements for various key sizes are presented in Fig. 10, Fig. 11, Fig. 12 , Fig. 13, and We selected the different key sizes to adequate protection until years from 2020 to 2050 using Lenstra's method [22] . Those key sizes correspond to a security parameter κ between 82 and 102 which means that we compare between 193 and 221 bits (depending on the number of features) when using the DGK+ protocol.
Estimation of Message Sizes
The size of exchanged messages highly depends on the implementation and the encoding used. We chose to give a theoretical estimate of the size of messages exchanged during the protocols.
In order to give the reader a concrete idea of size the of the messages we provide numerical estimates. For those, we imposed a strong encryption for Paillier's algorithm and choose M = log 2 (M ) = 2048 bits, corresponding security parameter κ = 95 (see [22] ). With Paillier's scheme the size of ciphertext is 2 M bits. We selected a model with d = 30 features. To get a bit-size estimate of the upperbound on inner products, we assumed that model weights and input data are normalised so that |x i | 1 and |θ| 1 when considering their real value or equivalently |x i | 2 P and |θ| 2 P when considering their integer representation (see Section 2.2). Hence B = (d + 1)2 2P and = 2P + log 2 (d + 1) = 111. In the case of feed forward neural networks, we chose L = 3 and d l = d = 30 (0 l L).
Message sizes and their numerical estimates are summarised in Table 1 .
Conclusion
In this work, we presented several protocols for privacy-preserving regression and classification. Those protocols only require additively homomorphic encryption and limit interactions to a mere request and response. They are secure against semi-honest adversaries. They can be used as-is in generalised linear models (including logistic regression and SVM classification) or applied to other machine-learning algorithms. As an illustration, we showed how they nicely adapt to binarised neural networks or to feed-forward neural networks with the ReLU activation function. 
